A Marshallian model of share tenancy by Vanags, A H
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Business - Economics Working Papers Faculty of Business
1990
A Marshallian model of share tenancy
A H. Vanags
University of Wollongong
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Recommended Citation
Vanags, A H., A Marshallian model of share tenancy, Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, Working Paper 90-11,
1990, 19.
http://ro.uow.edu.au/commwkpapers/326
THE UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
A MARSHALLIAN MODEL OF SHARE TENANCY
A. H. Vanags 
Department o f Economics 
The University o f Wollongong 
Wollongong NSW 2500 Australia
and
Queen Mary and Westfield College 
University o f London
Working Paper 90-11
Co-ordinated by Dr Charles Harvie & Di Kelly 
PO Box 1144 [Northfields Avenue], Wollongong NSW 2500 Australia 
Phone: [042] 270 725 or 270 555. Telex 29022. Cable: UNIOFWOL. Fax [042] 270 477
ISSN 1035-4581 
ISBN 0-86418-125-6
ABSTRACT
Despite persistent empirical support for the Marshallian model of share tenancy it 
remains out of favour at the theoretical level. There appear to be two reasons for this: Firstly, 
earlier attempts at theorizing an endogenous share rent under Marshallian assumptions implied 
that either the marginal product of land would have to be zero everywhere or that a competitive 
share rent equilibrium would fail to exist. The second objection to the Marshallian approach 
has been its failure to explain why inefficient Marshallian type contracts should survive under 
competitive conditions.
The aim of this paper is to develop a simple Marshallian model in which the share rent is 
endogenous and which is free from these objections. It is argued that an explanation for the 
persistence of ‘inefficient’ sharecropping may be that it allows landlords to appropriate a 
portion of tenant surpluses even though landlords have no individual market power. Moreover, 
it is shown that (for a suitable set of parameters) the inefficient share rent equilibrium would 
survive competition from ‘efficient’ contracts.
The work of Cheung (1968), (1969) has inspired a revival of interest in agricultural 
tenancy among economists from which two broad approaches to the theorisation of share 
tenancy have emerged. The first is the traditional or Marshallian one in which tenant choice 
with respect to both the quantity of land leased and to the application of labour and other non­
land inputs is unrestricted. This leads to the proposition that sharecropping is likely to be 
inefficient as compared with either owner production or fixed rent tenancy because the share 
rent has the effect of a tax which distorts the allocation of resources between land which is and 
is not sharecropped.
The other view, pioneered by Cheung, may be termed the ‘contracts’ or ‘monitoring’ 
approach in which it is supposed that landlords can and will stipulate tenancy agreements with 
both land and non-land inputs set at efficient levels. Hence, in the absence of other offsetting 
advantages, competition among landlords and tenants would eliminate any inefficient 
Marshallian contracts and only efficient contracts would be observed.
There is a persistent trickle of evidence pointing in the direction of the Marshallian 
position. For example, Bell (1977) concluded that ‘the predictions of the Marshallian view are 
generally in accord with the facts’ or more recently Shaban (1987), whose evidence indicates ‘a 
strong rejection of the monitoring approach’. Despite this, the Marshallian approach remains 
distinctly out of favour at the theoretical level.
However, Bell (1977) also identified a reason for the unpopularity of the traditional 
approach in observing that ‘it cannot be said that the analytical foundations of the Marshallian 
position inspire much confidence’. The principal aim of this paper is to shift this perception by 
suggesting a way of theorizing a competitive share rent market which is free from the objections 
to the Marshallian approach alluded to by Bell.
The theoretical difficulties associated with the Marshallian approach arise because, for 
the sharecropping tenant, the marginal cost of land appears to be zero —  hence the tenant will 
wish to lease in land up to the point where its marginal product is also zero. This has led to the 
belief that either, in equilibrium, the overall marginal product of land must be zero, which is 
regarded as implausible in locations such as parts of India where sharecropping is widely 
observed or that the Marshallian model must result in a persistent excess demand for land and 
hence a competitive share rent equilibrium may not exist, see e.g. Newbery (1975).
In fact, theorising an endogenously determined share rent under competitive market 
conditions, when agents satisfy Marshallian assumptions, i.e. tenants are free to choose the 
cultivation intensity and to lease from more than one landlord, has proved curiously intractable. 
The most notable attempt has been Bhardan and Srinivasan (1971) but their model is widely 
regarded as unsatisfactory precisely because it implies that under a share tenancy equilibrium 
the marginal product of land must be zero everywhere.1
A further objection to the standard Marshallian approach centres on its failure to identify 
an economic rationale for share tenancy. For a long time it was widely believed that the 
productive inefficiency of sharecropping could be offset by its superiority in terms of risk 
sharing but Stigliz (1974) and Newbery (1977) have shown that sharecropping has no risk
Bell and Zusman (1976) provide a Marshallian model with an endogenous share rent but in the context 
of a market structure which is not strictly competitive.
sharing advantages over a fixed rent and wage system. Few other offsetting advantages have 
been seriously proposed.2
Here it is suggested that a competitive share rent market can be theorised in a way 
which meets these objections to the Marshallian approach. In particular, it is shown that under 
the competitive share rent system developed below landlords may be able to appropriate a share 
of the ‘surplus’ which would accrue to tenants under a fixed rent system because tenants own 
non-marketed family resources. This provides a ‘rationale’ for the existence and persistence of 
‘inefficient’ share tenancy. The idea that sharecropping is a means of appropriating surplus is, 
of course, not new; however, what is novel here is the demonstration that appropriation can 
occur even though individual landlords have no market power. Moreover, it is shown that 
while the familiar Marshallian property of a zero marginal product of land holds for leased out 
land this is consistent with an overall positive marginal product of land and a zero excess 
demand for tenancies.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 1 outlines the main assumptions of the model 
i.e. technology, existence of markets etc. Section 2 characterizes the fixed rent equilibrium 
while Section 3 suggests a way of characterizing a competitive share rent equilibrium. Section 
4 provides a comparison of the two equilibria in which it is shown that share tenancy may in 
some circumstances provide landlords with sufficiently higher rental incomes to offset the 
efficiency disadvantages of sharecropping. Finally, Section 5 considers the question of the 
stability of the share rent equilibrium given that it is production inefficient and hence potentially 
vulnerable to erosion by efficient contracts.
1 THE MODEL
There are two classes of household —  landlords who own all the available land 
according to an exogenously given distribution and tenants who are landless.3 Both types of 
household own exogenously given quantities of non-land factors of production such as 
household labour, draught animals etc. However, it is supposed that the only organised market
2
Basu (1989) claims that limited tenant liability in the event of poor harvests may encourage excessively
risky production plans. This distortion of a fixed rent system would be prevented by the adoption of
share tenancy.
The possibility that tenants may also be landowners is ignored here.
yi = Gi (Hi - Hi) i -  1 ... M (Landlords) (1)
yj = fj (hj) j = 1 ... N (Tenants) (2)
where non-traded inputs have been suppressed, yj and yj are quantities of homogeneous
output, Hj is the landlord’s endowment of land, Hj is the quantity of land leased out by the ith
/
landlord and hj is the quantity of land leased in by the jth tenant. It is assumed that f. > O,
/  ft  / /
G. > 0 , f . < 0 and G . < 0. Also, it is assumed that the extensive character of agricultural 
i i J
production and the fixity of non-land inputs ensures that the marginal product of land on tenant
farms becomes zero at finite (and possibly quite small) levels of land leased in ie. for all i and 
/
for some finite hi, f. (hi) = 0.
l
Although landlord and tenant production functions are characterized as being different 
this is not necessary for any of the subsequent results but is convenient for expositional 
purposes. It is also convenient, but somewhat less innocuous, to assume that tenants are in fact 
identical i.e. fj (hj) = f(h) and similarly landlords i.e. Gj (Hi - Hj) = G(H - H).
Finally, it is assumed that there is no uncertainty. This together with the fact that each 
household’s labour supply is fixed, means that all households will seek to maximize income 
subject to the market constraints they perceive. Thus, landlords will choose their leasing policy 
so as to maximize the sum of own output and rental income, while tenants will seek to 
maximize output less rent.
2 A COMPETITIVE FIXED RENT EQUILIBRIUM
It is assumed that there are sufficiently large numbers of both landlords, M, and tenants, 
N, for the existence of a standard competitive market in land services. Landlord and tenant 
maximization then yields the conditions
G'(Hi - H) = R (3)
f(h ) = R (4)
where R is the market rent per acre.
A competitive equilibrium consists of H*, h*, R* and N* which satisfy (3), (4) and 
also the market clearing condition
MH* = N* h* (5)
In addition, each tenant household must earn an income at least as great as its reservation 
income Cj. This yields
f(h*) - r* h* > cj all j = 1 ... N* (6)
Any tenant for whom (6) is not satisfied would abandon cultivation, so the supply of tenants, 
N*, is endogenous to the model and is determined by the condition:
Cj < f(h*) - R* h* < Ck for j = 1 .... N* and k > N* + 1 (7)
It is clear that because of the marginal product of land is equalized across landlords and tenants 
the equilibrium characterized by equations (3), (4), (5) and (7) is Pareto efficient in a 
constrained sense.
3 .  A C O M PETITIV E SHARE RENT EQ U ILIB R IU M
Again it is assumed that there are sufficiently large numbers of landlords and tenants for 
no agent to have perceptible market power. However, this is not sufficient to define a 
competitive share rent market and the main theoretical problem lies in deciding how to model 
the market constraints that agents perceive i.e. what are the market variables that agents treat as 
parametric in the way that the rent per acre, R, is parametric in the fixed rent equilibrium. An 
obvious candidate is the share rent, r, — this was the procedure adopted by Bhardan and 
Srinivasan (1971) but it led them to the conclusion that, in equilibrium, the marginal product of 
land must be zero everywhere, a proposition which is widely regarded as implausible.
The difficulty with treating the share rent as the sole parametric variable is that it does 
not have the dimension of price hence, by itself, it provides insufficient information to the 
landlord on how his income will vary the quantity of land leased out. Something else is needed 
and here it is proposed that in a competitive market landlords would also regard the average 
product o f leased out land as akin to a market parameter.
This is justified as follows: since it is assumed that the landlord has no control over 
either the quantity of land leased-in by a given tenant or over the application of non-land inputs 
he has no direct means of controlling or predicting the yields on the land he leases out. 
However, past experience would be a pretty good guide as to what could be expected for a 
given grade of land and a given type of tenant household (both assumed to be homogeneous 
here). Moreover, average yields would change only rather slowly (if at all) through time. Thus 
taking one year with another the average product of leased out land is likely to be a relatively 
predictable magnitude and may be used safely as a basis for calculating the return from leasing.
Taken together, the share rent and the average product of leased out land have precisely 
the dimension of a price, i.e. rent per acre. Hence we suppose that the representative landlord 
would choose a leasing policy so as to maximize.
where r is the parametric share rent and b may be interpreted as the expected average product of 
leased out land and which is also regarded as a parameter by landlords.
For tenants the dimensionality of r poses no problems and they simply maximize
These maximizations yield the following conditions for landlords and tenants respectively
G (H -H ) + r b H (8)
[ 1 - r ] f(h) (9)
G ' [H - H] = r b 
f  (h) = 0
(10)
A  A  A  A  A
A share rent equilibrium is a set of H, h, r, b, and N which satisfy (10), (11) and also
A  A  A
b = b = f(h)/h (12)
A
i.e. the realized average product of leased out land, b, must coincide with what was expected;
A  A  A
M H  = N h  (13)
the market clearing condition; and finally
Ck > (1 - r) f(h) > Cj for j = 1 ... N and k > N + 1 (14)
which as before determines the number of tenants.
From equations (10 and (11) it is clear that, in contrast to the fixed rent equilibrium, the 
share rent equilibrium is Pareto inefficient because the marginal product of leased out land is 
different from that on owner cultivated land. However, unlike the model of Bhardan and 
Srinvasan (1971), the overall marginal product of land can be, and in general is, positive even 
though it is zero on leased land.
It is not immediately evident that a share rent equilibrium with f  (h) = 0 and r < 1 will
A
always exist. However, if h is sufficiently small in relation to the available supply of land, M
H, and if there are sufficient tenants with sufficiently low reservation incomes an equilibrium 
will always be possible.5
4 . A COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE TENURE SYSTEMS
A central problem in the debate on share tenancy has concerned the reasons why one 
tenure system is chosen or emerges rather than another, since often it appears that one system
However, as is shown below, if the share rent equilibrium leads to a significantly smaller number of 
tenants as compared with a fixed rent system then, even if possible, it is unlikely to be observed.
or the other is dominant.6 A comparison of the ‘performance’ of the alternative systems 
outlined here provides some insight on the conditions under which one or other could be 
expected to dominate.
One difference has already been noted. This is that the fixed rent system is efficient 
while the share rent equilibrium is not. Inefficiency is a well known property of models with 
Marshallian assumptions and has led to the view that such arrangements would be eliminated by 
the forces of competition e.g. Cheung (1969), Newbery (1975) and others. However, Bell 
(1977) and Shaban (1987) amongst others have offered evidence which suggests considerable 
support for the Marshallian view in practice. Nevertheless, there remains the problem of why 
an inefficient system should persist. Here, it is suggested that an explanation may lie in the fact 
that a share rent system will in certain circumstances confer distributional advantages on 
landlords which lead to a collective landlord preference of share-cropping over fixed rents. 
This possibility is easiest to demonstrate diagramatically.
Since households are assumed to be identical within each class, the equilibria of the two 
systems may be described in terms of a representative tenant and landlord. In addition, in order 
to illustrate the central point is is useful to assume, initially, that the number of tenants in the
A
fixed and share rent equilibria are the same i.e. N* = N = N. This may be interpreted as 
representing an inelastic supply curve of tenants over the relevant range of net incomes. With 
these assumptions there is no further loss of generality in assuming that N = M = 1, which then 
enables a simple diagramatic representation of the two equilibria. This is done in figure 1.
See for example Bell (1977), Bhardan and Rudra (1980) or Bliss and Stem (1982). Coexistence of fixed 
and share rent systems has come to be regarded as one of the ‘stylized facts’ regarding share tenancy 
which need to be explained. However, the empirical literature suggests that co-existence is by no 
means universal. Se also Byres (1983).
FIGURE 1
The total quantity of land available — owned by the landlord —  is O H. The landlord’s 
marginal product of land curve is the downward sloping curve G'(H - h) originating at C while 
the tenant marginal product curve is f  (h) originating at D.
The fixed rent equilibrium occurs at A where the marginal product of land is equated 
across tenants and landlords. The equilibrium rent is OR* and the quantity of land leased out is 
Oh*. Hence the income of the representative landlord consists of the sum of his own 
production, the area ACHh*, and rental income, the area OR*Ah*. The share rent equilibrium
A
is characterized at B, where the demand for land is Oh, which is determined by the condition 
that tenants will wish to lease in land up to the point where its marginal product is zero. The 
equilibrium share rent is then determined by the requirement that landlords should be just
A  A  A  A  —
willing to lease out the demanded quantity, Oh, —  this requires r to satisfy r f(h)/h = G (H  -
A
h). Landlord income is again given by the sum of own production and rental income i.e. by the
-  A  A A  A  A A
sum of the areas BCH h and OrbBh. It is clear that this exceeds (by amount R* rbBA) the 
income which accrues to the landlord under the fixed rent system.
The source of the gain experienced by landlords under the share rent system is the 
higher effective equilibrium rent per acre which obtains and which is at the expense of the 
surpluses (over and above the reservation incomes Cj) which tenants enjoy under fixed rents. 
Share cropping permits a partial appropriation of these by landlords even though individually
landlords have no market power.7 The competitive surpluses arise because of the diminishing 
returns which originate from the fixity of non-traded inputs possessed by tenants, and because 
of the inelastic of supply of tenants. If the latter assumption is relaxed then the advantages of 
share-cropping for landlords are reduced and may be eliminated entirely since a hypothetical 
switch from a fixed to share rent system would lead to some tenants abandoning cultivation 
which would then result in a lower rent per acre.
To illustrate this point consider the polar case where the supply of tenants is perfectly 
elastic at the reservation income c . The equilibrium of the representative tenant is shown in 
figure 2.
FIGURE 2
It is evident that if a landlord did have market power (in the sense of being able to restrict the size of 
tenants’ holdings) and could discriminate in setting share rents then the whole of the competitive 
surplus could be appropriated. In other words a monopolistic landlord can effectively practice perfect 
price discrimination by leasing on a share rent basis and evidently some of this ‘advantage’ is carried 
over to the competitive case.
under the marginal product of land schedule must just equal c. Under the share rent system
a  -
tenants would wish to lease Oh but in order to obtain a residual income equal to c the average
A A
rent per acre must be less than OR* e.g. O rb in Figure 2. Hence landlords are clearly worse 
off in the share rent equilibrium —  indeed if the supply of tenants is perfectly elastic a share 
rent equilibrium would never be observed if leasing on a fixed rent basis was available since 
any landlord could lease all the land he wished at the competitive fixed rent OR*.8
To sum up: landlords are definitely better-off under a share rent system than under a 
fixed rent one when the supply of tenants is inelastic even though the share rent system is 
inefficient, and even if landlords have no individual market power. If there is some elasticity in 
the supply of tenants this generates an offsetting force which tends to reduce the availability of 
surpluses and the average rent per acre through the departure of some tenants. When the 
supply of tenants is sufficiently elastic the competitive surpluses are effectively too small to 
offset the overall inefficiency of sharecropping.
5 .  THE STABILITY OF THE SHARE RENT EQUILBIRIUM
The argument of the previous section suggests a rationale for the Marshallian model 
may be found in the advantages that share tenancy confers on landlords as a class. However, it 
remains to be shown that the inefficient share rent equilibrium which generates those 
advantages will not be undermined by competition from efficient contracts.
An efficient contract can be devised for a landlord/tenant pair under which both are 
better off than in the share rent equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure 3 for the representative 
landlord and tenant of Section 3. The share rent equilibrium is at B, where the landlords
A A  A
rental income isO rbB h.
The assumption of a perfectly elastic supply of tenants is at the core of Cheung’s result that fixed and 
share rent systems are equivalent. If the supply of tenants is perfectly elastic and if both fixed and share 
rent systems are assumed to be viable then the equilibrium rent per acre must be the same under both 
systems, hence the land/labour ratio must also be the same —  a property which is ensured in Cheung’s 
model by the appropriate contract.
A contract which allowed the tenant to lease as much land as desired at the fixed rent
A A  A
OR* plus a fixed payment of R*rbBA + e(ABh), where 1 > e > 0, would be preferred by both
A  A
tenant and landlord. The tenant would benefit by (1 - e) (ABh) and the landlord by e(ABh) — 
i.e. such a contract would enable landlord and tenant to share the benefit of the increased output 
which follows from removing the distortion in the allocation of land between tenant and 
landlord.
FIGURE 3
The problem with this is that if all landlords offered such leases then, in a competitive 
market for leases, the fixed payment or premium would be competed down to zero ie. the fixed 
rent equilibrium would emerge. Thus the feasibility of an agreement between a given landlord 
and tenant pair which is efficient, but offers the landlord at least the same advantage as leasing
on a share rent basis, appears to require that the share rent system continues to prevail 
generally. A full analysis of such a situation can obviously be quite complicated. However, it 
is clear that a landlord would have an incentive to offer such a lease either if he believes that 
other landlords will not follow or, if they do, the short term gains offset the longer term losses. 
On the other hand if the landlord expects that others will follow and the short term benefit is 
less than the long term gain the share rent equilibrium will be stable. The following simple 
model provides an example of stability. Suppose all landlords are identical, and suppose that if 
any one takes advantage of a favourable short term contract then it is expected that all other 
landlords will follow in the next period. Let S be the benefit (income) per period enjoyed by 
landlords under the share rent system, F the benefit under a fixed rent system and S ' the one 
period benefit from breaking ranks. The subjective discount factor is 8. The present value of 
sticking with a share rent contract is therefore given by
I  5l S (15)
t= l
The present value of breaking ranks in period T is:
T-l
I  8l S + 8T S' + V 8T+tF  (16)
t - l  t= l
Subtracting (16) from (15) yields
OO
8 4 S - S '] +  X ST+t [S - F] (17)
t= l
If (17) is positive the share rent equilibrium will be stable. This is equivalent to
8 > -(S ~ S) or, if 8 = A , to i < (S - F)/(S' - S) 
(S ' - F) 1+1
as the condition for stability. Thus, the share rent equilibrium would be stable unless landlords 
were excessively ‘myopic’.
While not conclusive, the above example does show that stability of the inefficient 
equilibrium is not impossible. Indeed, with more complex assumptions one could envisage a 
situation in which a fixed rent ‘fringe’ coexited as free riders within a basically share rent 
system. Where this was the case the rent per acre (exclusive of any premium) would be 
expected to be lower than the average rent per acre implicit on share-cropped land. Evidence in 
Bliss and Stern (1982) and Johnson (1950) suggests that where fixed rents co-exist with share 
rents the rent per acre is indeed lower on fixed rent land.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The model developed above is not intended to provide a comprehensive theoretical 
account of sharecropping —- indeed, in practice, landlords often exercise considerable market 
and non-market power in ways that are crucial to a complete understanding of actual tenancy 
situations and hence the competitive model is probably inappropriate. The interest of the model 
therefore lies in the demonstration that it is possible to theorise the Marshallian approach to 
share tenancy in a way which is free from the objections to it alluded to by Bell (1977). The 
model proposed here also lends some theoretical support to another ‘traditional’ view according 
to which share tenancy is regarded as an exploitative system which enables landlords to 
appropriate the surpluses of landless tenants. The significant point in this context is that share 
rents provide a mechanism for appropriation even in the absence of market power on the part of 
landlords.
Two final observation are worth making. Firstly, the model provides some theoretical 
support for land reform. A land reform which redistributed land to tenants in amounts which 
were smaller than the quantity they leased in would redistribute income in favour of tenants and 
would improve productive efficiency —  similarly a mandatory reduction of the share rent 
would also improve efficiency and the distribution of income though in this case an excess 
demand for tenancies would arise.
Secondly, one of the stylized facts of sharecropping which Stiglitz and Newbery (1979) 
suggest theory should explain is the decline of sharecropping in modem developed economies. 
Economic development would be expected to increase the reservation incomes of potential 
tenants as increased and more rewarding urban employment opportunities are generated —  this 
would shift the supply curve of tenants, as well as make it more elastic, and would reduce the 
pool of rents available for appropriation by share tenancy thus over time removing the 
conditions underlying for the survival of sharecropping.
APPENDIX: THE MODEL WITH A LABOUR MARKET
When there is an organised labour it is assumed that tenants are in general net suppliers of wage 
labour and landlords are net demanders of it. Hence, the landlord’s net income, c, may be 
expressed as
c = G(H - H, L) + G i (H - H, L)H - G2(H - H, L)L (A .l)
where Gi is the marginal product of land, G2 is the marginal product of labour and L is the 
quantity of wage labour hired by the representative landlord. Equation (A .l) holds under both 
fixed rent and share rent systems but will vary in value with the equilibrium values of H and 
L. Let stars denote the equilibrium values of all variables under the fixed rent system and hats 
their values under share rents. Then
c* = G(H - H*, L*) + Gi (H - H*, L*) H* - G2 (H - H*, L*)L* (A.2)
A  _ A A  — A A A  — A A A
c = G(H - H, L) + Gi (H - H, L)H - G2(H - H, L)L (A.3)
Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) gives the change in the net income accruing to the landlord in 
moving from a fixed to share rent system.
Let G(H - H, L) = G, Gi (H - H, L) = Gi etc. this yields:
c - c* = [G - G*] + Gi H - Gi*H* - (G2 L - L*) (A.4)
Expanding G around (H*, L*) yields
G = G * + G i * ( H * - H )  + G2*(L-L*) (A.5)
A
Using (A.5) to substitute for G in (A.4) yields
c - c* = [Gi - Gi*] H - [G2 - G2*] L (A.6)
-  A
Suppose that the supply of wage labour is perfectly elastic at the wage rate w, then G2
G2* = w and (A.6) reduces to
c - c* = [ G i - G i * ] H  (A.7)
This case is effectively the same as the no labour market case i.e. landlords will gain from a
A
switch to share rents provided this increases the average rent per acre i.e. Gi > Gi*.
On the other hand if the land/labour markets in a particular locality are ‘closed’ then a 
hypothetical switch of tenure system would also affect the local wage rate assuming that 
tenants provide some of the local supply of wage labour. If the local wage rate fe ll  as a 
consequence of the switch then from (A.6) it is evident that this would reinforce the gain 
obtained by landlords.
However in general it is not possible to predict what will happen to the wage rate in this 
case even if the supply of tenants is supposed to be inelastic since there are two opposing 
forces at work. On the one hand a switch to share renting increases the attractiveness of wage 
labour for the tenant as opposed to working on his own holding —  this would tend to increase 
the supply of labour to the local labour market and depress the wage rate. On the other hand, 
because the marginal cost of land to the tenant is zero under a share rent the size of tenant 
holdings would tend to increase and there would be a corresponding need for extra labour to 
work one’s own holding, which would have the opposite influence in the local labour market.
Thus, if a labour market is operative the share rent system may continue to generate 
advantages for landlords as compared with fixed rents, though the precise circumstances in 
which this is so are more difficult to pin down.
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